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Recent Developments

Crane v. Scribner:
Statutory Cap on Non-Damages Does Not Apply When Plaintiff's Last Asbestos
Exposure was Before Statute's Effective Date
By: Farrah L. Arnold
he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held a statutory
cap for non-economic damages
does not apply when a plaintiff's last
asbestos exposure was before the
statute's effective date. Crane v.
Scribner, 369 Md. 369, 800 A.2d
727 (2001). The court further held
such a plaintiff has the burden of
proving the cause of action date
occurred before the statute went
into effect, which is ultimately a
question of fact to be determined by
a jury. Id at 369, 396-97, 800A.2d
at 727, 742-44.
While in the Navy, John
Scribner ("Scribner") worked
closely with Crane and Garlock
gasket materials that contained
asbestos. Upon discharge, Scribner
worked for PEPCO until 1995
when he was diagnosed with
mesothelioma. Scribner underwent
major surgeries but died from the
disease a few months later.
After Scribner's death, his wife
and children brought a wrongful
death action against the asbestos
manufacturers who were found
negligent and strictly liable in a jury
trial. Defendants Crane and
Garlock appealed to the court of
special appeals, arguing the trial
court erred in refusing to apply the
cap to the survival action as a matter
oflaw. The court of appeals granted
certiorari.

T

The court of appeals began its
analysis by examining three possible
approaches for determining when a
cause of action arises under section
11-1 08(b)(1). Crane, 369 Md. at
390, 800 A.2d at 739. The court
first considered the "manifestation
approach" set forth in Armstrong.
In Armstrong, the court rejected the
defendant's argument that a plaintiff's cause of action did not arise
until the disease manifested itself.
Id at 384, 800 A.2d at 735-36.
The court noted while such an
approach could be applied with
simplicity and certainty, this approach was statutorily inconsistent
because it disregarded the distinction between when a cause of
action arises from when a cause of
action accrues. Id at 390,800 A.2d
at 740. However, the court did not
expressly adopt an alternative
method of determination, but merely
ruled out the "manifestation approach." Id at 385, 800 A.2d at
736.
The court next considered the
"exposure approach" which suggested the cause of action occurred
when a plaintiff first inhales asbestos fibers that cause cellular changes
leading to disease. Id. at 390, 800
A.2d at 740. The court acknowledged while it is difficult to pinpoint
this exact moment, determination of
the latency period of the disease can

help detect when the disease was
contracted. Crane, at 382, 800
A.2d at 734. For instance, it can
be determined that the first cancer
cell developed in Scribner's body
prior to July 1, 1986 by examining
information such as his first and last
exposures to asbestos, the total
latency period ofthe disease, and
the rate of his tumor growth. Id.
The court noted that with hindsight,
one may reasonably determine if a
plaintiffhad the disease before the
cap was in effect. Id. at 384-85,
800 A.2d at 736.
The third approach, or the
"Grimshaw approach," looked to
when the disease itself arose in the
body. Id. at 390-91,800 A.2d at
739-40. Grimshaw specifically
recognized the cause of action
occurred before the diagnosis or
symptoms of mesothelioma arose,
but refused to conclude the action
arose at the time of exposure to
asbestos. Id. at 385, 800 A.2d at
736. The court stated this
approach is difficult to apply
because it evokes competing
medical expert testimony to define
the exact time of the action. Crane,
369 Md. at 391,800 A.2d at 736.
Moreover, this approach focused
intently on when the first cell turned
cancerous, which cannot be
accuratelyas-certained. Id.
Ofthese three approaches for
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determining a cause of action, the
court explained the "exposure
approach" had the fewest significant
problems and appeared most
consistent with the statutory
language. Id. at 390,800 A.2d at
739. The court held ifthe plaintiff's
last exposure to asbestos was
undisputedly before the statute's
effective date, then 11-108(b)(I)
does not apply as a matter oflaw.
Id. at 394, 800 A.2d at 742. The
court further elucidated that cases
where exposure occurred both
before and after the statutory
effective date will be left to the trier
offact. Id. at 394, 800A.2d at 742.
However, the court stated the
burden is on the plaintiff to establish
by sufficient evidence that his or her
cause of action occurred prior to the
cap's effective date. Crane, 369
Md.at 395, 800A.2d at 742 (citing
Owens-Corning v. Walatka, 125
Md. App. 313, 322-31, 725 A.2d
579, 583-88 (1999)).
The court explained the
"exposure approach" hinges on the
notion that there was an injury, and
thus a time of cause of action. Id.
at 392,800 A.2d at 740. The court
found the plaintiff's non-injurious
exposures to the defendant's
products were inconsequential to a
determination of cause of action. Id.
The court stated exactly when the
injury came into existence cannot be
reasonably ascertained through any
reasonably reliable methodology,
however it is certain that the greater
the exposure, the greater the cellular
damage. Id. at 392-93, 800 A.2d
at 741. The court noted it is not yet
possible to know which asbestos
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fiber ultimately caused the cell
division impenetrable to the body's
defenses. Id.
The Baltimore City trial
believed a jury should not consider
the issue of whether the cap should
be applied, nor should it resolve
when the plaintiff's cause of action
arose. Crane, 369 Md. at 396,
800A.2d 742-43. In Bauman, the
court, after the jury returned its
verdict, held a jury must resolve
disputes over when the cause of
action occurred. Id. at 396, 800
A.2d at 743 (citing OwensCorning v. Bauman, 125 Md.
App. 454, 726 A.2d 745 (1999)).
Based upon this holding, the second
jury was impaneled. Id.
Disagreement over impaneling
the second jury resulted because
statute 11-1 08(d) suggested a jury
may not be informed ofthe statutory
limitation. Id. The Bauman court
explained "not to reveal the cap to
the jury did not remove from it the
obligation to determine the factual
question of when the plaintiff's
cause of action arose .... " Id.
Moreover, a jury has as its very
function an obligation to be the trier
of fact when there is a genuine
dispute between parties. Crane,
369 Md. at 396-97, 800 A.2d at
743. The jury must, however, be
supplied with ap-propriate
instructions regarding what test or
method must be used to arrive at a
determination. Id. The court must
then decide whether the statutory
cap should be applied based upon
the jury's determination. Id.
The Defendants made casespecific complaints because they

believed Scribner failed to produce
sufficient evidence that the cause of
action arose prior to July 1, 1986.
Id. at 397, 800A.2d at 743. They
also argued impaneling the second
jury on this issue was inappropriate
because Scribner produced evidence to the first jury that was
inconsistent to the second time
around. Id. Because the jury found
the plaintiff had mesothelioma substantially caused by exposure to
Defendants' products, the court
stated these case-specific complaints were without merit. Crane,
369 Md. at 397,800 A.2d at 743.
Crane v. Scribner elucidates
section 11-1 08(b) regarding a
personal injury cause of action
sustained due to asbestos exposure.
While no succinct method can
steadfastly be applied to a
determination of the cause of action
date, the "exposure approach"
appears most statutorily consistent,
and has relatively minor problems.
While plaintiffs' last exposure to
asbestos is frequently well before
the statutory effective year of 1996,
this may not always be the case as
older buildings and facilities require
asbestos abatement to meet
upcoming renovation and
rehabilitation needs.

